I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face negative externalities when they share private information with borrowers. When lenders grant debt forgiveness to borrowers, borrowers communicate that information to other borrowers, who are then more likely to strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, contagion causes the default rate to increase by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, I further show that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication it tightens its debt forgiveness and origination policies to reduce information spillovers and mitigate the default contagion. Collectively, these results provide new evidence on the strategic interactions between a firm and its customers in a dynamic information environment.
Introduction
A large accounting literature discusses the role of proprietary costs in firms' disclosure decisions. Because observing proprietary costs is difficult, however, empirical evidence on the magnitude of those costs is limited. I examine how information externalities in small business lending affect the actions of borrowers and lenders, and in particular, how private information about lenders' debt forgiveness policies is transmitted to other borrowers, a form of information contagion that is costly to lenders. The debt forgiveness negotiation process creates a dynamic information environment in which lenders and borrowers both share private information. Although the information exchange can help both parties achieve a more efficient outcome, there is a risk of sharing too much information (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) .
Theoretical work shows that economic agents can strategically use a firm's proprietary information to their advantage (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Wagenhofer, 1990) . My research provides evidence on the costs that firms incur when they share private information with customers.
I present two key findings. First, I show that lenders face strategic default contagion when granting debt forgiveness to borrowers. This unintended consequence results from borrowers communicating the private terms of their debt forgiveness agreements to other borrowers, who are then more likely to strategically default on their own obligations. Second, I show that lenders learn about the extent of borrower communication and alter their operating policies to reduce information spillovers and mitigate the default contagion.
I use a detailed data set from Financiera Ayudamos (FA), a Mexican credit institution that grants small business and consumer loans. FA selectively grants debt forgiveness in cases of default in an effort to reduce losses on delinquent loans by incentivizing defaulters to continue repaying their loans.
1 I use these debt forgiveness events to analyze whether FA incurs costs due to private information transmission between borrowers regarding its forgiveness policy. The idea is that a borrower who is granted debt forgiveness learns private information regarding the extent of the lender's willingness to give a discount on the loan repayment and can subsequently share this information with other borrowers. Financially able borrowers can strategically use this information to their advantage to get a reduction on their loan balance. Any information asymmetry regarding a borrower's ability to pay exacerbates this issue. If the lender is unable to clearly distinguish between borrowers who can and cannot repay their loans, it is more likely that he will unknowingly offer debt forgiveness to strategic defaulters.
A distinct feature of this setting is that lenders only share private information through private contracts with select borrowers. Although these borrowers can communicate with others, the extent of communication is unknown ex-ante. It is therefore unclear whether the information externalities are substantial enough for the lender to alter its operating decisions to reduce the amount of private information shared with borrowers. Alternatively, borrowers may not share the details of this forgiveness event with others, because unlike a publicly disclosed event such as foreclosure, a default and the subsequent renegotiation with the lender are private.
To identify costs due to information externalities it is necessary to disentangle strategic defaults from defaults that are the result of economic adversity. My empirical approach is based on the simple premise that borrowers' primary economic shocks occur at work, whereas communication among borrowers occurs in the home neighborhood. I am able to draw this important distinction because of the particularities of the Mexican setting. First, many individuals commute over an hour to work. This allows me to separate the default rate in the work area from that in the home neighborhood. A high default rate in the work area indicates that borrowers suffer shocks to income, whereas a low default rate indicates stable economic conditions. If an individual defaults but does not suffer a shock to his income, I
then consider the default to stem from his home neighborhood.
Defaults that originate in the home neighborhood have two possible explanations: (i) an event that causes a shock to expenses or (ii) strategic default due to communication between borrowers. Communication is high within Mexican neighborhoods because they comprise tight-knit groups of families and friends who have lived there most of their lives and interact through weekly community activities (Keefe, 1984) .
2 Therefore, to determine whether the default stems from communication about the lender's forgiveness policy, I examine the forgiveness rate within the home neighborhood. A high forgiveness rate within a neighborhood indicates more borrowers have experienced the debt forgiveness process. As these informed borrowers communicate about the lender's willingness to forgive, neighborhoods with a high forgiveness rate will have many defaults. I then control for the contemporaneous default rate, inflation, and natural disasters to rule out any shocks to the neighborhood's expenses.
My first set of results measures the extent of strategic default in a neighborhood after the lender grants debt forgiveness to a borrower. I find evidence of strategic default contagion resulting from communication among borrowers regarding the lender's forgiveness policy. If FA doubles its forgiveness rate in a neighborhood, the default rate increases by 1.7% in the following month. This default contagion is equivalent to a 10.9% increase in FA's monthly default rate. These results are robust and valid for a wide range of econometric tests. In addition to controlling for economic shocks, I include various fixed effects and complement the regression analysis with an instrumental variables (IV) approach and a propensity score method.
My findings have three critical implications. First, firms not only release information through disclosure, but also through their operating actions. In my setting these operational decisions are private internal policies; however, firms also make public operational decisions, such as expanding their operations or releasing new products, which likely reveal proprietary information to outsiders. Second, firms incur significant informational costs when negotiating with customers. Although theoretical models define customers as potential opponents of a firm, the extant empirical literature has focused almost exclusively on competitors as users of firms' proprietary information. Third, the evidence I provide raises questions about whether increasing renegotiations is an optimal strategy to attenuate the high foreclosure rate. This issue is important because of the recent foreclosure crisis. In 2008 the U.S.
government instituted the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), which, in an effort to solve the foreclosure crisis, provides lenders with incentives to renegotiate more loans. Consistent with the conjecture of Posner and Zingales (2008) , my results illustrate that there are negative externalities associated with increasing loan renegotiations.
To provide additional evidence on the causal link between debt forgiveness and strategic default, I exploit a plausibly exogenous event that caused a change in FA's debt forgiveness policy. In late August 2012, FA's director of risk management unexpectedly resigned to accept a position at a larger financial institution. While FA searched for a replacement, responsibility for approving debt forgiveness was transferred to executives in the marketing department who then granted debt forgiveness more freely. In September 2012, a borrower in default was twice as likely to receive debt forgiveness as in the prior month. As a result, the percentage of loans in default increased from 41.1% to 47.3% during the following six months. Consistent with strategic default, the increase was concentrated in the group of loans that were one to 29 days delinquent. By contrast, adverse economic conditions would affect default across all delinquency groups.
Next, to further investigate the communication mechanism driving strategic default I analyze borrower interconnectedness within neighborhoods. I expect that highly interconnected borrowers communicate more and thus exhibit higher strategic default contagion after forgiveness has been granted within their home neighborhood. To test this conjecture, I construct two measures of borrower interconnectedness: (i) the fraction of borrower referrals within a neighborhood and (ii) the geographic concentration of loans within zip codes surrounding each branch. I find that after the change in forgiveness policy, branches holding a more concentrated loan portfolio or a portfolio with a higher referral rate suffered a higher incidence of strategic default. Taken together, my results provide evidence that communication among borrowers results in information contagion that is costly to lenders.
Finally, I examine whether the lender learns from strategic default contagion. The motivation behind this analysis is to understand whether firms recognize that privately disclosed information spreads between their counterparties and the extent to which they adjust their policies to mitigate the negative externalities. Studying firm learning is challenging because equilibrium outcomes are typically observed. However, the surge in defaults after FA's exogenous event provides an ideal setting to examine lender learning after the surge in defaults in September of 2012. I test whether the lender adjusts its origination and forgiveness policies to limit the spread of its private information. I find that FA's branches learn from strategic default contagion and react by increasing the strictness of their forgiveness and origination policies within nine months of the event. The policy changes are stronger for those branches that experienced higher strategic default contagion.
These results illustrate that lenders recognize the informational trade-off they face when making operational decisions that reveal proprietary information. As such, they alter their policies to mitigate the negative externalities resulting from communication about their willingness to modify loans. These findings also shed light on the observation that a low incidence of loan renegotiations occurred during the financial crisis. Prior studies by Piskorski et al. (2010) and Adelino et al. (2013) investigate whether institutional frictions arising from securitizations explain the small number of loan renegotiations. I show that although the expost observation that lenders did not increasingly renegotiate during the financial crisis might seem counterintuitive, lenders limit the number of renegotiations because they recognize the informational costs ex-ante.
My study makes several contributions. To my knowledge, this study is the first to measure the information externalities of sharing a lender's private information with customers. I use a unique approach to show that although the lender shares information privately, borrowers communicate what they learn to other borrowers. This result provides empirical evidence that supports the theory that customers can play the role of a firm's strategic opponent.
In addition, although I study the lender-borrower relationship, my findings are applicable to other settings where two parties transact with one another privately, such as supplier negotiations, government-firm negotiations, or a central bank offering capital infusions to a particular bank. Lastly, I am able to isolate the effect that a lender's operating policies have on borrowers' decisions to strategically default. Disentangling this effect is a step toward finding appropriate solutions for foreclosure contagion.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents results on the impact of forgiveness on strategic default contagion; and Section 5 further explores communication as the mechanism driving strategic default. Section 6 examines creditor learning. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Customers are traditionally regarded as economic agents who contribute positively to the firm's bottom line; however, they can also play the role of a strategic opponent if they use the firm's private information to their advantage (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Wagenhofer, 1990) . In particular, firms constantly share information with customers in negotiations (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) , and the spread of this information can impact the firms' bargaining power and the outcome of other negotiations. For example, customers may demand a discount if they learn that a price concession was granted to another customer. Therefore, understanding whether information shared during private negotiations spreads and measuring the resulting costs for the firm is important.
Although offering debt forgiveness is not a disclosure choice in the traditional sense, it is an operating decision that reveals private information to outsiders. In this respect, my study is related to the literature on proprietary information, which analyzes whether sharing information with outsiders is beneficial for the firm. In particular, the majority of proprietary information studies extensively analyze the effect of competition on different disclosure decisions, such as product development information (Guo et al., 2004; Jones, 2007) , material contract filings (Verrecchia and Weber, 2006) , sales and cost information (Dedman and Lennox, 2009) , and customer information (Ellis et al., 2012) . These studies find that despite market pressures, firms do not fully disclose all private information because of competitors. My study is similar in that firms face a trade-off when deciding whether to release more or less information in negotiations with customers.
A unique feature of my study is that I examine information sharing through a private contract. Therefore, the firm cannot perfectly anticipate whether and to what degree information will spread, making it difficult to set optimal policies ex-ante. I exploit this feature to analyze whether the lender learns about the extent of proprietary costs resulting from information transmission among its borrowers and how the lender alters its policies in response.
A recent study by Ali et al. (2014) shows that firms with high proprietary costs prefer financing options that allow them to circumvent disclosure requirements. My study complements their findings by providing evidence that a financial institution modifies its debt forgiveness and origination policies because of the high cost of sharing private information.
My work also relates to two recent streams within the mortgage literature. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) use survey data to examine the moral and social determinants of homeowners' attitudes toward strategic default. They find that homeowners are more likely to default if they know of other strategic defaulters, in part because they perceive the bank is less likely to pursue them. Further work examines how foreclosure spreads within neighborhoods, performing an analysis within Maryland (Towe and Lawley, 2013) , an analysis in Illinois (Munroe and Wilse-Samson, 2013) , and a national analysis that controls for neighborhood and zip-code (Goodstein et al., 2013) . These studies find that foreclosure is contagious and that neighbors' behaviors influence default.
My study differs from these prior studies in three respects. First, my study is concerned exclusively with how the spread of the lender's private information affects strategic default.
I am able to identify this because I observe defaults and loan modifications that are private.
By contrast, a foreclosure is a publicly disclosed event making it difficult to disentangle communication about the bank's proprietary information from any learning that occurs regarding the economic trajectory of the neighborhood or foreclosure procedures (Towe and Lawley, 2013; Munro and Wilse-Samson, 2013 My identification relies on borrowers living in a tight-knit neighborhood and commuting 3 SOFOMs do not require approval from the National Banking Regulator and are exempt from capital requirements unless they have an economic relationship with a banking institution (Pena, 2008) .
4 FA facilitates the borrowing process by accepting non-traditional documents as proof of income. For example, FA accepts receipts from inventory purchases as proof of income, whereas most commercial banks strictly require payroll receipts or bank statements.
to work. Consistent with this, on average, FA's borrowers have spent 67% of their life at their current home and travel 3.8 linear miles to work. Given the mountainous geography of Mexico, the linear distance likely understates the commute to work. For example, in Mexico City, a 3.8 linear mile can require travel of over six miles on the road, corresponding to a commute in excess of one hour.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the monthly loan performance. FA monitors loan performance on a weekly basis. In a given month, an average of 16% of borrowers miss a payment and are considered to be in default. Each branch is required to pursue collection efforts, which begin with loan officers placing telephone calls and making home visits. The branch can also offer debt forgiveness should the first two methods become ineffective. Debt forgiveness is contingent on the borrower (i) paying the remainder of his deficiency such that the loan becomes fully current and (ii) committing to make the rest of his payments on time. Prior to September 2012, FA granted forgiveness to an average of 10% of defaulters, on approximately 4% of the loan principal.
5
Once delinquency surpasses 60 days, FA's centralized collection division takes over the collection process. This division is, on average, less than 15% successful at getting loans back into repayment. Lastly, once the loan is more than 90 days delinquent, it is transferred to an external collection agency that charges a percentage of any recovered portion of the loan.
Borrower Communication and Strategic Default

Contagion
Identification Strategy
My first hypothesis is that lenders incur information externalities when they grant debt forgiveness, because borrowers communicate with other borrowers who are then more likely to default. To test this hypothesis, I must differentiate defaults that are due to information spillovers from those that are purely due to adverse economic shocks. To do so, I use a novel approach that exploits the particularities of the Mexican setting.
First, I account for economic shocks to a borrower's income that could make him unable to repay his loan. I exploit the fact that Mexicans typically commute to work, and separately analyze the default rate of a borrower's work area and home neighborhood.
6 A high default rate in a borrower's work area indicates that local economic conditions that impact takehome pay are deteriorating. In particular, the income of small business owners, who sell food, clothes, personal care items, repair cars, repair shoes, etc., is highly dependent on common local factors such as a large store opening in the vicinity, a company closing down or downsizing, nearby protests during the week, construction in the area, etc. INEGI reports that, on average, the two greatest expenses for individuals within the corre-sponding income decile of my sample of borrowers are food (41%) and transportation (17%).
However, my sample period had modest annual inflation rates under 4.5%. Thus, the rise in the cost of these goods is unlikely sufficient to cause an increase in neighborhood default.
Lastly, if a neighborhood does not experience a widespread shock that causes expenses to increase, a borrower's default is more likely driven by communication among neighbors regarding the lender's forgiveness policies. In particular, the majority of individuals in
Mexico live in the same neighborhood from infancy to adulthood, forming strong ties to their community of large extended families and friends (Rodriguez et al., 2007) . Weekly activities within these neighborhoods also contribute to the high level of information sharing. As such, I examine whether a borrower is more likely to default after forgiveness is granted to other borrowers within his neighborhood.
Considering FA's forgiveness policy, a strategic default due to communication would occur as follows: (i) Borrower A defaults in month t, (ii) Borrower A receives forgiveness in month t + 1, and (iii) Borrower B defaults in month t + 2. Because Borrower B's decision to default is separated from Borrower A's default by two months, it is much less likely that Borrower B's default is due to a pervasive economic shock that impacts the entire home neighborhood at one point in time. In sum, my identification strategy is that economic shocks that impact the borrower's ability to repay his loan are correlated among borrowers that work in the same area, whereas defaults that are correlated among borrowers that live in the same neighborhood are primarily due to information transmission. forgiveness. Therefore, it will be more difficult to detect contagion.
Empirical Analysis
To implement the identification strategy I estimate the following panel regression:
The dependent variable, Def ault i,t , is binary and takes the value of one if a borrower's loan i is in default at month t, but not at month t − 1, and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable, F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 , is the forgiveness rate in borrower i's home zip code in the prior month. Using lagged forgiveness rate overcomes the reflection problem that arises in social interaction models (Manski, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001 ).
7
To control for other determinants of default, I include measures of economic conditions, borrower characteristics, and loan characteristics. I construct a variable, Def ault Rate work,t , as a proxy for local economic conditions that impact borrowers' ability to repay their loans.
8
This variable measures the proportion of loans that are delinquent in the zip code where borrower i works (excluding borrower i). I also include industry and time fixed effects to 7 The reflection problem arises when determining whether group behavior affects the behavior of individuals (Manski, 1993) . The issue is that group behavior is merely the aggregate of individual behaviors.
8 I construct this variable because a measure of local economic conditions is unavailable at the zip-code level. INEGI's most granular economic measures are reported at the state level. In addition, INEGI's state data are reported quarterly and thus do not allow for a monthly analysis.
control for macroeconomic cycles and seasonality.
I control for demographic characteristics that affect a borrower's ex-ante likelihood of default: age, gender, education, credit score, number of years living in the current house as a fraction of age, and number of years owning the current business as a fraction of age. I expect that a borrower who has owned his business for many years is more likely to generate a stable income than a borrower who recently started his business.
I control for loan characteristics: payment frequency, size of the loan relative to income, and the portion of the loan that is repaid. I expect that borrowers are not likely to default immediately after obtaining a loan or when a few payments are left. I also anticipate that default is more likely to occur on loans with weekly payments, because FA grants biweekly or monthly payments only to borrowers that demonstrate a relatively stable source of income.
Lastly, I cluster standard errors at the branch level to account for branches operating in distinct areas and therefore the possibility that they implement collection efforts differently. Table 2 presents results of the strategic default regressions using a linear probability model.
Empirical Results
Linear regression analysis
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A 1% increase in the debt forgiveness rate within a neighborhood increases the likelihood that an additional borrower will default by 0.087% (column 1). This contagion is large in terms of economic magnitude. If FA doubled the debt forgiveness rate within a neighborhood, the likelihood of a borrower defaulting in a given month increases by 1.7%, equivalent to approximately a 10.9% increase in FA's monthly default rate. Further, the joint effect of P ct P aid and P ct P aid 2 indicates that the probability of default is a concave function that reaches its maximum when 66% of the loan is repaid. Therefore, as predicted, defaults do not typically occur at the beginning or near the maturity of the loan.
9 I use a linear probability model for ease of interpreting coefficients and because it allows for a larger set of fixed effects. However, in untabulated results I run logistic specifications and find similar results.
In column 2, I use FA's Internal Credit Score as a control, in lieu of borrower characteristics. The internal credit score variable aggregates borrower characteristics and can capture nonlinearities that FA has already identified and incorporated into its scoring formula. It also has the added benefit of increasing the sample size, because approximately 36% of FA's borrowers lack a credit score. I find that the coefficient of F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 remains positive and significant.
Next, I examine repeat defaulters to test whether the likelihood that a borrower defaults increases after he receives debt forgiveness on his loan. An individual repeatedly defaults for two reasons: (i) he is a bad borrower or (ii) he is taking advantage of the information that he previously learned about FA's willingness to offer forgiveness. Accordingly, I include two additional explanatory variables (column 3). The first variable, N ot F orgiven, is binary and takes the value of one for borrowers who defaulted in the past but did not receive forgiveness. The second variable, P ast F orgiveness, is also binary and takes the value of one for borrowers who received forgiveness in the past. The coefficient of N ot F orgiven is positive, indicating that bad borrowers are more likely to default again. However, consistent with borrower learning, the coefficient of P ast F orgiveness is greater than the coefficient of N ot F orgiven. The difference in the two coefficients shows that conditional on being a bad borrower, learning about forgiveness increases the likelihood of default by 14.3%.
In column 4, I include repeat borrowers. I am interested in this subset of borrowers because their past borrowing history with the lender creates less information asymmetry regarding their wealth. These borrowers are also likely interested in renewing their existing loans or obtaining new loans, which increases the cost of taking actions that negatively affect their credit score. In particular, when making renewal decisions, FA penalizes borrowers for having received forgiveness on a loan. Generally, FA does not renew a loan if the borrower has defaulted within six months or defaulted multiple times in the past. Approximately 5% of repeat borrowers received forgiveness on a previous loan. In line with my prediction, the coefficient of Repeat Borrower is negative and significant, indicating that repeat borrowers default less on average. The interaction coefficient of F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 × Repeat Borrower indicates that repeat borrowers do not default more when the forgiveness rate increases in their neighborhood. This is consistent with the lender being more informed about the repeat borrowers' wealth, making it more difficult for this subset of borrowers to strategically default and obtain forgiveness.
In column 4, I substitute Def ault Rate work with the interaction of work area and month fixed effects. The purpose of the work-month fixed effects is to eliminate the effect of economic shocks that are common to all businesses in a given work area each month. Lastly, I
include home neighborhood fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics of the home neighborhood that can influence the likelihood of default (column 5). The coefficients are estimated from within-home-neighborhood variation, requiring that any potential confounding event be correlated with time-varying home neighborhood characteristics. The coefficient of F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 is positive and significant in all specifications.
Instrumental variables
As an alternative empirical method, I use instrumental variables (IV) to strengthen the causal link between prior forgiveness and default (Table 3 ). The objective of the IV approach is to exploit shocks to the home neighborhoods' forgiveness rate that are exogenous to each borrower. This is different from the regression analysis, which attempts to control for all economic conditions that affect borrowers. As such, IV allows me to circumvent potential concerns about endogeneity in FA's decisions to grant debt forgiveness. If FA can detect different levels of communication across neighborhoods, its best response is to lower debt forgiveness in areas with high communication. From a statistical perspective, this rational behavior by FA would result in a downward bias in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.
For each borrower i, I instrument the home neighborhood's forgiveness rate by using the fraction of neighboring borrowers that work in a different area and became delinquent in t−2, N ew Def ault Rate work(−i),t−2 . The first-stage regressions show that this instrument satisfies the relevance restriction (Table 3 , Panel B). The coefficient of the instrument is positive and significant and the F -statistics are above the critical value for a weak instrument as stated by Stock et al. (2002) . This instrument likely satisfies the exclusion restriction because of two reasons. First, it is constructed using the default rate of borrowers that work in a different zip code and are therefore exposed to different local economic conditions. Second, the instrument is lagged by two periods, further separating economic shocks suffered by the defaulters from shocks that could affect borrower i. Given that these borrowers have minimal or no savings, it is unlikely that they will be able to withstand economic shocks for a prolonged period of time without defaulting. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the only channel by which N ew Def ault Rate work(−i),t−2 affects borrower i's decision to default is through the level of forgiveness that i observes in his home neighborhood.
In line with my previous results, the coefficient of F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 is positive and significant across all specifications. These coefficients are larger than those of the OLS regressions, which is consistent with a downward bias in the OLS estimates. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the forgiveness rate in the home neighborhood increases the default rate by 2.6%.
Overall, the results in this Section indicate that the lender's day-to-day operations reveal proprietary information to customers who then communicate the terms of their agreement to other borrowers, causing negative externalities in the form of strategic default contagion. The lender's private information spreads even when it is exclusively disclosed in a private contract.
Considering that all types of firms engage in a multitude of private contracts this result is likely to apply to other settings where two companies transact with one another privately.
For example, any firm that decides to grant better delivery terms, additional warranty, or additional services to select customers can incur costs if doing so induces additional customers to demand the same treatment. In addition, although my setting focuses on communication among individual borrowers, prior research has found evidence of information transmission among decision makers at different firms. For instance, manufacturing executives gather and transmit information about retailers' payment policies through business associations (Doner and Schneider, 2000) , investment managers communicate with other local investment managers about portfolio allocation decisions (Hong et al., 2005) , and executives within the same social networks discuss and influence each other's managerial decisions (Cohen et al., 2008; Shue, 2013) . Therefore, the mechanism of communication among individual customers regarding a firm's private information is also generalizable to communication among firms' decision makers. 
Robustness and Alternative Explanations
I perform a number of additional tests to evaluate the robustness of my main results. First, I rule out potential shocks to expenses in the home neighborhood. Then I use a propensity score method to evaluate the impact that past forgiveness has on default.
10 For more details on the consequences of the HAMP see Agarwal et al. (2012) .
Shocks to expenses at the home
I use a series of alternative specifications to test for possible alternate explanations for strategic default contagion (Table 4) . First, I include the contemporaneous default rate in the home neighborhood as a control for potential correlated economic shocks in the home neighborhood that drive borrowers' default. A drawback of including this variable, Def ault Rate home,t , is that it is affected by the lagged forgiveness rate. As such, it will absorb a portion of the effect associated with F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 and thus, attenuate the coefficient. Although the coefficient of F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 is downwardly biased in this specification, it remains positive and significant (column 1). Therefore, increasing debt forgiveness increases strategic default contagion after controlling for economic conditions. Next, I include inflation subcomponents to control for price increases in different types of goods consumed by the borrowers. For example, according to INEGI, the average borrower in my sample spends 17% of his income on transportation. Therefore, I expect that borrowers will be more likely to default when there is a high inflation rate with respect to transportation goods and services (column 3). Including these controls does not affect the coefficient of F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 . The coefficients of inflation in transportation, clothing, and housing are positive and significant. By contrast, the coefficient of inflation in food prices is not statistically significant, likely due to the large portion of borrowers in my sample that own food sales businesses.
In column 4, I analyze natural disasters because they are economic shocks that can cause a correlation in defaults among borrowers living in the same neighborhood. I include a binary variable, N atural Disaster, that takes the value of one for loans in states that suffered a natural disaster during the year, and the interaction term 
Placebo test
Under my contagion hypothesis, I expect that granting forgiveness in a home neighborhood reveals proprietary information that creates incentives for other borrowers to strategically default. As such, randomized forgiveness rates should not explain future defaults. I conduct placebo tests that assign a random home neighborhood to each borrower (column 5). I find that the average coefficient of forgiveness rate in the placebo tests is not statistically different from zero. In addition, this coefficient is positive and significant in only 3% of my simulations.
Propensity score method
Next, I use a propensity score method to evaluate the impact of past forgiveness on default.
This method allows me to compare the default rate between two groups of identical borrowers who have been exposed to different levels of forgiveness in their home neighborhoods during the previous month. Group one is exposed to high forgiveness, whereas group two is exposed to low forgiveness. In addition, this method captures any nonlinearities in the control variables, because it relies on logistic regressions to estimate propensity scores. I estimate the propensity scores from the following logistic model: (1983) , I then rank the observations by their estimated propensity score and classify them into five strata. The average home neighborhood and work area default rates are similar across the treated and untreated groups in each of the strata (Panel A, Table 5 ). Lastly, I compare each borrower's rate of default across the treated and untreated groups in each stratum.
I show that after controlling for economic and loan characteristics, borrowers exposed to high forgiveness in their home neighborhood during the previous month have a higher likelihood of defaulting in the current month (Panel B, Table 5 ). Specifically, the default rate for the high forgiveness group is between 0.9% and 4.7% higher than that of the low forgiveness group. Taken as a whole, these findings show that my main results are not altered by plausible economic shocks to the home neighborhood or using a propensity method as an alternative empirical approach.
Communication Channel
The 2012 Event
As of 2007, FA's debt forgiveness policy required that each branch file a formal request and obtain approval from FA's central risk management department before granting debt forgiveness to a borrower. The risk management department reviewed all formal requests to ensure each loan was at least six months old and that each borrower signed a risk awareness form that outlined the negative credit consequences of receiving debt forgiveness. 11 On average, only 10% of defaulters received debt forgiveness. Of these, few were repeat forgiveness cases as FA typically declines requests for repeat forgiveness.
In August 2012, the director of the risk management department unexpectedly left FA for a position in a much larger credit institution. Consequently, the department lacked a manager with the authority to approve debt forgiveness, and within two weeks, a large backlog of requests accumulated. To alleviate the issue, the CEO/president of the company temporarily transferred the approval responsibilities to executives within the marketing department.
Given the marketing department's lack of experience in assessing risk and their focus on business growth, the executives rapidly granted most forgiveness requests as a means of getting clients to repay. The executives also eliminated the need for borrowers' signatures on the risk awareness form. As a result, FA's total dollar amount forgiven increased 188% from the previous month (Figure 2 ).
In light of my prior results, I anticipate that the loan performance worsened after this event, because of a surge in strategic defaults. To examine this prediction, I compare monthly transition matrices of delinquencies in FA's loan portfolio during the six-month period before and after September 2012. Loans that were one to 29 days delinquent increased from 29.9% to 36.8%, whereas all delinquent loans over 30 days slightly decreased from 11.2% to 10.5% (Table 6 , Panels A and B). These results have two implications. First, because the delinquency rate did not increase across all groups, adverse economic conditions do not account for the high incidence of default. Second, the increase in debt forgiveness was not an effective policy to reduce the overall number of loans in default. An effective policy would have caused a larger decrease in delinquent loans over 30 days and little to no impact on the rate of loans that were one to 29 days delinquent. In addition, the likelihood that, in a given month, non-delinquent borrowers became delinquent increased by 2.24% and the likelihood that loans with delinquencies over 60 days re-entered repayment status increased by 0.51% (0.39%+0.12% in Panel C).
In sum, the new forgiveness policy intended to help delinquent borrowers get back into repayment, yet it had the unintended consequence of incentivizing strategic default among nondelinquent borrowers. Moreover, an additional unintended consequence is a cross-subsidy between sophisticated and unsophisticated borrowers as described by Campbell (2006) . Strategic defaulters are likely the higher credit quality borrowers among the group of defaulters, and will most likely absorb the majority of the forgiveness offered by FA. 12 Consistent with this conjecture, the credit quality of borrowers that received forgiveness improved. The average internal credit score increased from 585 points to 597 points after the forgiveness policy change.
"Neighborhood Interconnectedness"
To further analyze the mechanism driving my prior results, I test whether neighborhood interconnectedness explains strategic default contagion in the cross-section of branches. I expect that tight-knit neighborhoods exhibit a high level of inter-borrower communication.
Therefore, branches granting loans to borrowers residing within tight-knit neighborhoods will experience a higher level of strategic default contagion as compared to branches that grant loans to less inter-connected neighborhoods. A potential concern is the endogeneity of branches' decision to grant forgiveness, because in equilibrium, branches that observe more communication may grant less forgiveness. To address this concern, I exploit the change to FA's forgiveness policy in September 2012. I construct two measures of the level of neighborhood interconnectedness one month prior to the policy change, and test whether they explain the level of strategic default observed during the three months after the change. 
where h i.j is equal to the number of loans originated by branch j in zip code i as a fraction of the number of loans in the portfolio of branch j. I use the following linear specification to analyze the relation between strategic default and neighborhood interconnectedness:
In this regression, Strategic Def ault j is equal to α 1,j × F orgiveness Rate j , the product of the average marginal effect of the forgiveness rate and the average forgiveness rate. I estimate α 1,j from the following specification: Rate is statistically significant at the 10% level (Table 7) . This result suggests a positive relation between the fraction of referred customers and future contagion. By contrast, 13 I use the coefficients α 1,j and their joint variance-covariance matrix obtained from regression 5 to simulate 10,000 random draws of each coefficient α 1,j,s from a multivariate normal distribution. I then estimate regression 4 using each set of simulated coefficients α 1,j . I report the average coefficient and p-value obtained after repeating the estimation of regression 4 10,000 times.
Concentration may not be a good predictor of future contagion, because the variable lacks more detailed geographic and demographic data, such as zip code size and population density.
14
In sum, neighborhood interconnectedness helps explain the level of strategic default observed after the lender modified its forgiveness policy. This result is consistent with borrower communication as the channel by which the lender's private information spreads. As additional borrowers communicate about the lender's willingness to offer debt forgiveness, strategic default contagion increases.
Lender Learning
In this Section, I examine whether the lender internalizes the costs resulting from borrowers communicating the terms of their renegotiation agreements. Specifically, I investigate whether the lender alters its operating policies as it learns about strategic default contagion.
Although it is well understood that companies learn by doing (Arrow, 1962) 
Forgiveness Policy
FA's branch managers receive a bonus as a function of delinquencies in their respective loan portfolios. As such, they have incentives to minimize the number and extent of nonperforming loans. One method to reduce defaults is to modify the forgiveness policy. Given that 14 The INEGI does not report information about the geographic size and total population at the zip code level, thereby limiting the set of variables available to construct more sophisticated measures.
FA grants individual branches the autonomy to implement stricter forgiveness policies, I
expect that branches that experience high strategic default will learn about the information externality and thus tighten their forgiveness policy. It is ultimately an empirical question as to how long a branch would take to identify contagion; therefore, I conduct the analysis using learning periods of three, six, and nine months (Figure 3 
where Likelihood of F orgiveness is measured after the learning period, Strategic Def ault j is the product α 1,j ×F orgiveness Rate j estimated from equation 5 using the learning period, and T otal Def ault j is the average default rate observed in branch j during the learning period.
I find no clear relation between strategic default and likelihood of forgiveness within a three-month learning period (Table 8 , column 1). Thus, the branches are either unable to detect strategic default or fail to react by tightening their forgiveness policy. Consistent with the notion that learning occurs gradually, increasing the learning period to six months strengthens the relation between strategic default and forgiveness policy strictness (column 3), with a larger coefficient in absolute value and smaller p-value.
In a nine-month period (column 5), the branches tighten their forgiveness policies in response to learning from contagion. Branches that experience higher strategic default are less likely to grant forgiveness to defaulters. In columns 2, 4, and 6, I include the average default rate of the branch as a control for any change in overall default, which could drive the change in forgiveness. My results are robust to including this additional control. In addition, I use simulations in all specifications to correct standard errors for the presence of a generated regressor.
Origination Policy
Next, I examine how FA branches adjusted their origination policy within the three, six, and nine months after the surge in defaults in September 2012. Branches can reduce strategic default by improving the quality of their borrowers through stricter loan origination policies.
Alternatively, branches can be less strict in origination. Although the latter strategy may seem counterintuitive, it could prove effective if the lender credibly commits to not grant debt forgiveness. The idea is that borrowers would refrain from strategically defaulting once they realize that delinquent loans will not be forgiven. Relatedly, managers may choose a less strict origination policy due to their compensation incentives. FA pays an additional bonus that increases as a function of the number of loans originated. Managers can therefore substitute their loan performance bonus with the origination bonus. Specifically, when the loan performance bonus decreases due to increased default, managers can lower origination standards to increase their origination bonus.
Traditionally, FA's loan granting process takes less than 24 hours and relies on the borrower's credit score and internal origination score. The credit and origination scores are compared to the company's loan granting thresholds. The branches cannot grant loans to individuals who fail to meet the minimum requirements; however, they can choose to deny a loan to an individual that meets the minimum requirements. If a branch sets higher standards such that it rejects candidates that meet FA's requirements, it is considered stricter.
To examine whether the level of information transmission during the learning period affects the strictness of the origination policy for a given branch, I conduct the following test:
I calculate the dependent variable, Decision to Reject, as the number of requests that qualified for a loan and were rejected, as a fraction of all qualifying requests. This measure is based on branches' actual decisions, as opposed to the average quality of new borrowers.
Therefore, the measure has the advantage of circumventing concerns regarding a strictness change occurring because of loan requests from worse candidates.
The relation between level of contagion and origination strictness after a three-month learning period is not statistically significant (Table 9 , column 1). The relation between strategic default and origination policy strictness is stronger for six and nine-month periods (columns 3 and 5). Therefore, as the learning period increases, the lender's branches are better able to detect strategic default and in turn tighten their origination policies. In addition, branches that suffer from higher levels of strategic default are more likely to reject loans that meet FA's origination thresholds. After a nine-month learning period, a 1% increase in strategic default leads to a 0.8% increase in loan rejections (column 5). This is equivalent to a 10.1% increase in the likelihood that a branch rejects an acceptable loan request.
In sum, I find that the branches modify their operating decisions as they learn about strategic default contagion. On average, branches that experience a higher level of contagion react within nine months by granting less debt forgiveness and by rejecting more borrowers that meet FA's loan origination thresholds. Accordingly, lenders renegotiate less often as they learn that renegotiations are suboptimal because of information externalities.
Conclusion
This paper exploits a unique setting to examine the negative externalities companies face when revealing private information to customers. Using a detailed data set of loans to small business owners, I find strategic default contagion among customers within the same neighborhood who communicate regarding the lender's forgiveness policy. I also find that the lender learns from strategic default contagion and attempts to mitigate it by tightening its debt forgiveness and origination policies.
A distinct feature of my setting is that negotiations occur in a private setting. Therefore, my findings shed light on the dynamic information environment of private negotiations and information transfers between firms and their customers. While theoretical models demonstrate that customers can play the role of a firm's strategic opponent, there is a paucity of empirical evidence that quantifies the costs incurred when a firm shares private information with customers. I am able to quantify the cost by estimating the level of strategic default contagion after forgiveness is granted.
Customers are particularly important to study because they are a key determinant of a firm's success. Their relationship with firms allows them to gain access to information that is not publicly available. As such, it could be especially damaging to a firm if customers freely communicate the information they obtain through negotiations. It is also valuable to understand how customers' actions impact the firm. My results show that firms take into account the possibility of customer communication and modify their operating decisions accordingly.
Furthermore, my paper contributes to the foreclosure contagion literature by demonstrating the consequences of loan modifications. The objective of loan modifications is to curtail default. However, in line with the economic predictions of Posner and Zingales (2009) , I show that loan modifications do not achieve an efficient outcome. Instead, due to borrower communication, loan modifications (i) only modestly reduce the likelihood that a loan in default becomes uncollectible and (ii) cause the lender to incur expenses beyond that of granting forgiveness to financially distressed borrowers, as financially able borrowers strategically default. Lastly, I show that lenders recognize strategic default as a cost associated with loan modifications and therefore limit their renegotiation activities. This finding helps answer the question of why there was a low incidence of loan renegotiations during the financial crisis.
A.1 Definition of variables
Variable Description Age Borrower's age in years.
Concentration
Herfindahl index measure of the zip code concentration of loans held by each branch on August 2012.
Credit Score
Borrower's credit score at origination, as reported by Buró de Crédito. Scores range from 400 to 850.
Commuting Distance
Number of miles between home and work zip codes.
Decision to Reject
Number of loans that met the minimum origination requirements but were rejected, divided by the total number of loans that met the minimum origination requirements.
Def ault t
One if the borrower was current on his loan in month t − 1 and defaulted in month t − 1; zero otherwise.
Def ault Rate home,t
Total number of nonperforming loans in month t as a fraction of all loans in the borrower's home zip code.
Def ault Rate work,t
Total number of nonperforming loans in month t as a fraction of all loans in the borrower's work zip code.
Education
The highest degree of education attained by the borrower. One if primary school, 2 if secondary school, 3ee if high school or technical school, 4 if undergraduate degree, 5 if graduate degree, and 0 otherwise.
F orgiven in the past
One if the borrower has previously received forgiveness on his current loan; zero otherwise.
F orgiveness Rate home,t−1
Total number of loans that received forgiveness in month t − 1 as a fraction of all loans in the borrower's home zip code.
F raction of lif e at current home
Years at current home divided by age.
F raction of lif e at current occupation
Years at current occupation divided by age.
Gender
One if the borrower is male, zero otherwise.
Inf lation
Monthly inflation rate, as reported by INEGI.
Variable Description
Internal Credit Score
FA's internally generated borrower loan eligibility score, which incorporates demographic information and credit score. Score ranges from 0 to 680.
Loan Amount
Principal amount of the loan in thousands of Mexican pesos.
M ultiple Accounts
One if the borrower has multiple credit accounts at origination, zero otherwise.
N atural Disaster
One if the state where the borrower lives used funds from the Federal Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN) during the year; zero otherwise.
N ew Def ault Rate work(−i),t−2
Fraction of borrowers that become delinquent in t − 2 and satisfy the following two conditions: (i) they live in the same home neighborhood as borrower i, and (ii) they do not work in the same area as borrower i.
N ot F orgiven
One if the borrower has defaulted in the past, but did not receive forgiveness; zero otherwise.
P ayment F requency
One if the loan requires monthly payments, two if it requires biweekly payments, and three if it requires weekly payments.
P ct P aid
Percentage of the loan paid.
Square of the percentage of the loan paid.
Ref erral Rate
On August 2012, the fraction of borrowers that had been referred to FA through a family member or friend.
Repeat Borrower
One if the borrower has previously had a loan with FA; zero otherwise.
Reported Income
Borrower's income in thousands of Mexican Pesos as reported at origination.
Strategic Def ault
Estimated marginal effect of forgiveness α 1,j times average forgiveness rate.
T otal Def ault
Number of loans in default divided by the number of loans in the portfolio of each branch. This figure presents a graphical exposition of the identification strategy. Borrowers A and B live in the same tight-knit neighborhood. They commute to their respective working areas where they each run a small independent business. Analogously, Borrowers C and D live in another neighborhood and they also commute to the respective locations of their small businesses. I define strategic contagion in the following way: suppose Borrower A and Borrower C default on their small consumer loans, because of an economic shock that affects the whole work area. The lender offers Borrower A debt forgiveness as a means of getting him out of default and back into repayment. Borrower A subsequently communicates with his neighbor, Borrower B, regarding the lender's forgiveness policy. Borrower B then chooses to strategically default with the objective of getting a portion of his loan forgiven. Borrower D does not default, because he neither experiences an economic shock nor has any interaction with Borrowers A or B. This figure presents the time structure of the learning analysis conducted in section 6. Each of the three learning periods begins on September 2012, the date that FA changed its debt-forgiveness policy. Learning period 1 consists of three months after the policy change and the corresponding testing period begins thereafter. Learning period 2 consists of six months after the policy change and the corresponding testing period begins thereafter. Learning period 3 consists of nine months after the policy change and the corresponding testing period begins thereafter. (−i) ,t−2 , is defined as the fraction of borrowers that become delinquent in t − 2 and satisfy the following two conditions: (i) they live in the same home neighborhood as borrower i, and (ii) they do not work in the same area as borrower i. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A reports the summary statistics of the main control variables for the groups of high and low forgiveness in each stratum. Panel B reports the likelihood of default for the low-and high-forgiveness groups conditional on the probability that the loan was exposed to different levels of forgiveness. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the one-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents loan-performance transition matrices. In all panels, the rows indicate the delinquency status of the loan at month t, ranging from non-delinquent to over 90 days delinquent. The columns indicate the status of the loan at month t + 1, ranging from non-delinquent to over 90 days delinquent. In Panel A, the transition probabilities are calculated for the six-month period before the change in forgiveness policy. In Panel B, the transition probabilities are calculated for the six-month period as of the change in forgiveness policy. Panel C reports the difference between Panel B and Panel A, with *, **, and *** indicating significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In this model, the dependent variable is computed as the average likelihood that a defaulter in branch j receives forgiveness. In columns 1 and 2, the analysis is performed over a three-month learning period, in columns 3 and 4, a six-month learning period, and in columns 5 and 6, a nine-month learning period. In all Columns, the main explanatory variable is the level of strategic default among borrowers serviced by branch j. Strategic default is measured as α 1,j × F orgiveness Rate j , estimated from: Def ault j,t = α 0 + α 1 F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 + Controls + T ime F.E., columns 2, 4, and 6 include the level of total defaults in each branch as an additional control. Simulations are used to correct the standard errors for the presence of a generated regressor. P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
A.2 Correlations table
Learning period: 3 months 6 months 9 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) In this model, the dependent variable is computed as the number of loans rejected by branch j as a fraction of the number of loans that met FA origination requirements. In columns 1 and 2, the analysis is performed over a three-month learning period, in columns 3 and 4, a six-month learning period, and in columns 5 and 6, a nine-month learning period. In all columns, the main explanatory variable is the level of strategic default among borrowers serviced by branch j. Strategic default is measured as α 1,j × F orgiveness Rate j , estimated from: Def ault j,t = α 0 + α 1 F orgiveness Rate home,t−1 + Controls + T ime F.E., columns 2, 4, and 6 include the level of total defaults in each branch as an additional control. Simulations are used to correct the standard errors for the presence of a generated regressor. P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
